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1 Introduction
An undeniably stylized fact of the last 50 years is that, with a few exceptions, the
poorest countries of the world did not catch up with industrialized nations in any
meaningful way. Although a considerable amount of research has been devoted to
the understanding of growth and development, economists have not yet found how to
make poor countries richer. Nonetheless, in the quest for growth, increasing human
capital has usually been considered as an adequate policy. In this context, it has
long been argued that the brain drain curbs human capital accumulation in poor
countries and exacerbates inequality across nations, i.e. makes rich countries richer
at the expense of the poor. The brain drain looks particularly harmful if concentrated
in some strategic occupations (e.g. healthcare, teaching, etc.) and if skilled migrants
were trained in their country of origin. Under the leadership of Jagdish Bhagwati,
a series of models were developed throughout the 1970s to emphasize the negative
consequences of the brain drain for those left behind, a literature which has been
reformulated in an endogenous growth framework twenty years later1. According to
this traditional or pessimistic view, reducing the brain drain lowers the development
potential of sending nations.
On the contrary, a new wave of research has emerged since the mid-1990s around
the idea that skilled migration also generates benecial e¤ects for sending countries.
Those e¤ects can partly or totally compensate the costs of losing talents. More
precisely, the brain drain cost is attenuated if origin countries receive larger amounts
of remittances, benet from diaspora externalities or from brain circulation and return
migration2. One particular strand of this new literature is even more optimistic and
reveals that the brain drain ambiguously impacts human capital accumulation in
developing countries. Several authors such as Mountford (1997), Stark et al. (1997,
1See among others Bhagwati and Hamada (1974), McCulloch and Yellen (1977), Miyagiwa (1991)
or Haque and Kim (1995).
2Surveys of the literature can be found in Commander et al. (2004) or Docquier and Rapoport
(2009).
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1998), Vidal (1998), Beine et al. (2001, 2008), Stark and Wang (2002) argue that ex-
ante (i.e. before emigration occurs), migration prospects foster education investments
in sending countries. Ex-post, some educated individuals will e¤ectively leave whereas
others will stay put. The net/global impact on human capital accumulation becomes
ambiguous. If the ex-ante e¤ects is strong enough, the origin country may end up with
a higher level of human capital after emigration is netted out than under autarky.
The debate is now shifted to the empirical ground.
Evidence of an ex-ante incentive e¤ect has been found at the micro level. In
their survey on medical doctors working in the UK, Kangasniemi et al. (2008) re-
port that about 30% of Indian doctors surveyed acknowledge that the prospect of
emigration a¤ected their e¤ort to put into studies; Commander et al. (2007) provide
clear indications that the software industrys booming has been met with a power-
ful educational response, partly related to migration prospects. Lucas (2004) argues
that the choice of major eld of study (medicine, nursing, maritime training) among
Filipino students respond to shifts in the international demand for skilled workers.
Batista et al. (2007) estimate that migration prospects are responsible for the bulk
of human capital formation in Cape Verde. Gibson and McKenzie (2009) show that
Tongas "best and brightest" students contemplated emigration while still in high
school, which led them to take additional classes and make changes in their courses
choices. Chand and Clemens (2008) compare education choices of ethnic Fijians and
Fijians of Indian ancestry in the aftermath of the 1987 military coup and interprete
di¤erences as quasi-experimental evidence on the incentive mechanism.
To investigate the extent to which the incentive e¤ect can be generalized to other
countries and whether it is strong enough to generate a brain gain (i.e. a positive
global e¤ect on human capital), macro-level analyzes are needed. Taking advantage
of new cross-country databases on international migration by education attainment3,
3See Docquier and Marfouk (2006), Docquier, Lowell an Marfouk (2009), Beine Docquier and
Rapoport (2007).
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Beine et al. (2008) conrm that migration prospects positively and signicantly
impact human capital formation in a cross-section of 127 developing countries. De-
pending on the magnitude of the migration rate and initial human capital stock, the
global e¤ect of the brain drain (after migration is netted out) can be positive or neg-
ative. Beine et al. (2008) use counterfactual simulations to estimate the short-run
net e¤ect of the brain drain for each country and region. The counterfactual exper-
iment consists in reducing the high-skill emigration rate to the level of the low-skill
rate. Comparisons between observed and simulated human capital levels show that
the brain drain depletes human capital in 53.4 percent of developing countries. These
losersinclude many small and medium-sized countries exhibiting skilled emigration
rates above 50 percent. On the contrary, the brain drain has a positive but moder-
ate net impact on human capital in countries combining low levels of human capital
(below 5%) and low skilled migration rates (below 20%). The group of winnersin-
cludes the main "globalizers" (e.g., China, India, Brazil) and other countries such as
Indonesia, Thailand, Mongolia, Venezuela, Argentina, or Egypt. Beine, Docquier and
Rapoport (2009) and Docquier, Faye and Pestieau (2008) complement the previous
study by testing several functional forms for the incentive mechanism, endogenizing
educational policies at origin or using adjusted measures of the brain drain to account
for country of training. In most cases, the incentive mechanism is signicant and the
group of net winners remains the same.
In spite of these encouraging results, the debate remains controversial since, due to
data availability, existing empirical studies are all relying on cross-country regressions.
Hence, they may su¤er from mispecication biases and the impossibility to capture
unobserved heterogeneity between countries (see Islam, 1995). In addition, the exact
causality between human capital formation and skilled migration is not easy to detect
in a cross-country setting, although instrumentation techniques are implemented. A
panel data extension seems appropriate to address some of those criticisms.
Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to revisit the macro-level analysis of the
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brain gain using a recent and original panel database on international migration and
human capital with 6 observations by country (from 1975 to 2000). We rst test for
the existence and robustness of the incentive hypothesis in -convergence regression
models of human capital accumulation. Second, we examine whether the magnitude
of the incentive mechanism varies with the country level of development. Finally, we
conduct numerical experiments based on the estimated model to assess the net/global
e¤ect of the brain drain on human capital accumulation at origin.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we develop
a simple theoretical model characterizing human capital accumulation in developing
countries. We model the e¤ect of skilled migration on the decision to educate and
on the proportion of educated in the remaining labor force. We demonstrate that
the relationship between skilled migration and human capital accumulation ambigu-
ously depends on the level of development of the sending country, a prediction which
has been relatively disregarded in the exiting literature. Our theoretical model also
demonstrates that it is important to treat the probability of migration as an endoge-
nous variable. Section 3 presents the original panel data on skilled migration and
human capital, which can be used to test the model predictions. Section 4 gives the
empirical results. Based on a cross-section -convergence model, our results provide
some support in favor of a conditional convergence process of human capital accu-
mulation. Skilled migration prospects have a positive impact on human capital accu-
mulation. However this incentive e¤ect is only perceptible in low-income countries. It
is not signicant in lower-middle, upper-middle and, unsurprisingly, in high-income
countries. Hence, the brain drain ambiguously impacts human capital accumulation
in low-income countries; however, it unambiguously decreases the average level of
schooling in rich and middle-income countries. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory
This section describes the theoretical mechanisms underlying our empirical model and
derive the main testable predictions. Our framework is similar to that used in the
recent brain gain literature, except that we explicitly emphasize the way the level of
development at origin a¤ects the size of ex-ante incentive mechanism. This link was
disregarded in previous contributions but will prove to be important in our empirical
analysis.
Each economy is populated by two-period lived heterogeneous individuals. Young
individuals work and may invest in human capital. In adulthood, individuals supply
all their time on the labor market.
Technology is endogenous. The proportion of educated workers a¤ects the wage
rate through a static Lucas-type externality (see Lucas, 1988). Hence, if skilled mi-
gration modies the proportion of educated in the labor force (used as a proxy for
the stock of human capital), it a¤ects the welfare of those left behind. We assume a
linear production function with labor in e¢ ciency unit as a single input. High-skill
and low-skill workers are thus perfect substitutes: each low-skill worker supplies one
e¢ ciency unit of labor whereas each highly skilled supplies  > 1 such units. At each
period t, the gross domestic product is given by Yt = wtLt where Lt is the total labor
force in e¢ ciency unit, and the wage rate per e¢ ciency unit of labor, wt = w(Ht), is
an increasing function of the proportion of high-skill adults remaining in the country
(with w
0  @w
@H
> 0 and w
00  @w2
@2
7 0 to allow for increasing marginal returns).
Regarding individual preferences, the expected utility depends on the rst-period
income and the (potentially uncertain/expected) second-period income (y1;t and y2;t+1).
There is no saving . Utility is log-linear and there is no time-discount rate. We have
E [ut] = ln(y1;t   ) + E [ln(y2;t+1)] (1)
where  is the level of subsistence (such that   w(0)). Such a parameter is im-
portant to model liquidity constraints. For mathematical tractability, we assume no
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subsistence level in the second period of life.
Young individuals o¤er one unit of human capital and earn the low-skill wage wt.
They have the possibility to invest in education by spending a part of their income.
There is a single education program and individuals are heterogeneous in their ability
to learn. Agents are characterized by heterogeneous education costs (denoted by h),
with high-ability individuals incurring a lower cost. The cost of education is expressed
as a proportion of the wage rate. For a type-h agent, the cost is denoted by hwt
where  is a parameter capturing the training technology and the scal policy (the
more education is subsidized, the lower ). For simplicity, the variable h is distributed
on [0; 1] according to a uniform density. In adulthood, individuals o¤er all their time
on the labor market. Low-skill adults receive wt whereas the highly skilled receive
wt.
With this stylized model, we rst characterize the benchmark closed economy
solution before investigating how skilled emigration a¤ects welfare and economic ac-
tivity. In a no-migration economy (subscripted n), it is straightforward to show
that education is optimal when
ln(wn;t   hwn;t   ) + ln(wn;t+1) > ln(wn;t   ) + ln(wn;t+1) (2)
Given the distribution of ability, the ex-ante proportion of educated in the young
generation hn;t is equal to the critical level of ability below which education is desir-
able:
hn;t  wn;t   
wn;t
    1

(3)
It is an increasing function of the skill premium  and of the local wage rate wn;t;
it is a decreasing function of . Our model thus reects the fact that in poor countries
the enrolment in education is low for two possible reasons: (i) only a few people can
a¤ord paying the education costs or (ii) domestic returns to education can be too
small.. It is worth noticing that hn;t is independent on the future wage rate wt+1.
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Without migration, the ex-ante proportion hn;t is equal to the ex-post proportion of
educated adults of the next period: Hn;t+1 = hn;t. As wn;t is a function of Hn;t and
given the possibility of technological increasing returns (w
00
7 0), our closed economy
model is compatible with the existence of poverty traps (see Azariadis and Stachurski,
2005). Contrary to other models of the recent literature, the existence of a subsistence
level and wage externalities can give rise to multiple steady states.
Consistently with micro-level evidence, let us now analyze howmigration prospects
may a¤ect human capital accumulation. In a probabilistic-migration economy
(subscripted m),4 we consider that young individuals anticipate a probability of mi-
grationmt+1 if they opt for education. We assume that low-skill adults have no access
to migration. This simplifying assumption is reasonable since recent databases clearly
show that low-skill emigration rates are immeasurably lower than those of the highly
skilled. In a probabilistic migration framework where hm;t denotes the proportion of
young opting for education ex-ante, the ex-post proportion of highly skilled among
remaining adults becomes:
Hm;t+1 =
(1 mt+1)hm;t
1 mt+1hm;t (4)
Ex-post (i.e. for a given investment in education ex-ante), it is obvious that the
skilled emigration ratemt+1 reduces Hm;t+1. However, if correctly anticipated, migra-
tion prospects also a¤ect the expected return to schooling and induce them to educate
more, at least if migration results in higher income abroad. We denote by w the net-
of-migration-costs wage rate in the potential host countries and, for simplicity, assume
a constant skill premium across countries. In high-income or upper-middle-income
countries where the domestic wage rate is equal or higher than w, migration prospects
do not a¤ect education choices: the closed economy model applies. In low-income
and lower-middle-income countries, individuals engaging in education investments
4Given quota systems and various types of restrictions imposed by immigration authorities t
destination (such as the point systems), there is a probability that a migration project will have to
be postponed or abandoned at all stages of the process. Following the recent literature, we consider
the probabilitic migration framework as reasonable to model human capital accumulation.
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may contemplate the prospect of emigration and take decisions under uncertainty.
Ex-ante, the expectation of mt+1 increases the proportion of young agents engaging
in education, hm;t; creating the possibility of a net gain for the source country.
If w > wm;t+1, education is optimal when it maximizes expected utility:
ln(wm;t   hwm;t   ) +mt+1 ln(w) + (1 mt+1) ln(wm;t+1)
> ln(wm;t   ) + ln(wm;t+1): (5)
The ex-ante proportion of educated in the young generation is now given by
hm;t  wm;t   
wm;t



w
wm;t+1
mt+1   1


w
wm;t+1
mt+1 (6)
Clearly, if mt+1 = 0, we obtain the same proportion as in the closed economy
(hm;t = hn;t). Otherwise, when

w
wm;t+1
mt+1
> 1; the critical level of ability increases
with mt+1 and more individuals engage in education. Formally, for w > wm;t+1, the
incentive mechanism is characterized by the following derivative
@hm;t
@mt+1
=
wm;t   
wm;t

ln

w
wm;t+1



w
wm;t+1
mt+1 > 0 (7)
There is a close link between the size of the incentive e¤ect and the level of
development at origin. On the one hand, in least developed countries where the
average wage rate is close to the subsistence level, liquidity constraints limit the
capacity of people to respond to incentives. On the other hand, the lower the level
of development, the stronger are the expected migration premium and the impact of
migration prospects on the expected return to schooling.
Finally, although skilled individuals form expectations on the future probability
to emigrate, thismigration probability must be considered as potentially en-
dogenous since there are risks of reverse causation from human capital accumulation
to migration rates.
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A rst risk of reverse causality comes from the fact that countries with a long
tradition of human capital investments may have invested more in the quality of
education. The higher the proportion of educated among adults (including teachers),
the higher the quality of education and the probability to overcome immigration and
labor market restrictions in developed destinations. Formally, this means that mt+1
can be seen as an increasing function of Hm;t+1.
A second risk of reverse causality is due to immigration policies at destinations.
Suppose that the receiving country is willing to accept an absolute number Qt of edu-
cated immigrants at time t. The anticipated immigration quota Qt+1 can be expressed
as a fraction qt+1 of the adult native population at time t+ 1. Hence, the higher the
proportion of educated adults, the lower the probability that each of them will leave
the country. Under perfect foresights, individuals anticipate mt+1 = qt+1=hm;t which
is clearly a negative function of the ex-ante proportion of educated. Although explicit
origin-based-quota systems are rarely observed in OECD countries, this prediction
is compatible with the stylized facts and empirical ndings presented in Docquier,
Lohest and Marfouk (2007): ceteris paribus, an increase in nativesaverage level of
schooling reduces the skilled emigration rate.
To sum up, the four main testable predictions of our model are the following:
1. In a framework with Lucas-type externalities and a minimal subsistence level
of consumption, human capital accumulation is governed by a dynamic process
which can give rise to multiple long-run equilibria. A realistic empirical model
of human capital accumulation should allow for long-run disparities between
countries.
2. Skilled migration prospects positively impact human capital formation in the
sending countries where expected local wages are su¢ ciently low compared to
the wage rate observed in industrialized destinations. This can be the case in
middle-income and low-income countries.
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3. The size of this incentive mechanism ambiguously depends on the country
level of development. Interacting skilled migration prospects and country-
development dummies is necessary to identify the link.
4. An appropriate empirical model of human capital accumulation with migration-
induced incentives should account for the potential endogeneity of the skilled
emigration rate. Instrumental techniques are required.
Predictions 1 and 2 were investigated in previous studies (see Beine et al, 2008,
2009). Prediction 3 will be rigorously tested in this paper. Prediction 4 is implicit in
many previous works and is theoretically founded here.
3 Human capital and migration data
The model predictions can be tested by regressing an indicator of ex-ante human
capital formation of natives (i.e. residents + emigrants) on the skilled emigration
rate and other country-specic characteristics. Our dependent variable will be the
log-change in the proportion of highly skilled (individuals with post-secondary educa-
tion) among natives. This requires collecting data on human capital of residents and
emigrants. This work was done by Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Docquier, Low-
ell and Marfouk (2009) who provide emigration rates by education attainment and
human capital indicators for all countries in 1990 and 2000. These estimates were
used in cross-country regressions supporting the incentive mechanism. We follow
here the work of Defoort (2008) who generalizes the Docquier-Marfouks method-
ology and, in order to overcome the limitations of cross-section approaches, builds
a similar database covering the period 1975-2000 with data sampled at a ve-year
frequency.
The skilled migration rate (capturing mt) is dened as the ratio of the stock of
high-skill natives living in OECD (i.e. emigrants) countries to all high-skill natives
born in the country (i.e. residents + emigrants). To compute this ratio, it is necessary
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to quantify the proportion of high-skill within the emigrant and resident populations.
The proportion computed for residents is a good proxy for the ex-post stock of human
capital Ht dened in (4); the proportion computed for the sum of residents and
emigrants is a good proxy for the ex-ante stock of human capital ht dened in (6).
The high-skill group corresponds to workers with post-secondary education.
Regarding the residentsproportion of post-secondary educated people, several
data sources are available for for di¤erent samples of countries and periods. Defoort
(2008) mostly uses data from Barro and Lee (2001) for developing countries, and
from De La Fuente and Domenech (2002) for OECD countries. For countries where
Barro and Lee measures are missing, she uses Cohen and Soto (2007) or transpose the
proportion observed in the neighboring country with the closest domestic enrolment
rates in tertiary education.
Regarding the education structure of emigrants, she collects immigration data by
country of birth and education level from various OECD countries. Such details can
be found in host countriescensus and register For each origin country, emigration
stocks by education level are then computed by aggregating the numbers sent to all
destinations. Compared to previous works, Defoort (2008) extends the time series
dimension by collecting census data from 1975 to 2000. Unfortunately, census and
register data cannot be obtained from all OECD countries on such a long horizon.
Consequently, she has to focus on a more limited number of host countries. She
collects census data on immigration by country of birth and by education attainment
from the 6 major receiving OECD countries, i.e. Canada, Australia, the US, the UK,
France and Germany. Compared to Docquier and Marfouk (2006), these 6 countries
represent 77 percent of the OECD skilled immigration stock in 2000. However, for
particular countries sending a small proportion of their migrants to the 6 major
destinations, the estimates can be much less reliable5. For each origin country, we
5For example, this is typically the case of Suriname sending most of their migrants to the Nether-
lands.
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construct a reliability rate equal to the 2000 share of the 6 host nations in the skilled
emigration stock in the OECD. In our regressions, we either exclude observations
characterized by a reliability rate lower than 70 percent or use reliability rates in
weighted least squares models.
The data set reveals interesting features. Although globalization and selective
immigration policies have undoubtedly increased the number of skilled emigrants to
the OECD, the intensity of the brain drain has been extremely stable at the world
level or at the level of developing countries as a whole. This can be explained by
two important supply changes at origin: (i) the population size in developing coun-
tries has increased hugely and (ii) all countries (even the poorest ones) experienced
a remarkable rise in education attainment. As shown on Figure 1, some regions ex-
perienced an increase in the intensity of the brain drain (Central America, Eastern
Europe, South Central Asia and Sub Saharan Africa) while signicant decreases were
observed in other regions (notably the Middle East and Northern Africa). Regions
where the brain drain increased signicantly are those where education progresses
were small and conversely. This comforts our choice to endogenize the probability of
migration in regressions.
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Figure 1. Long-run trends in skilled emigration rates
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4 Panel data analysis
Our empirical investigation relies on the standard framework of convergence models.
In particular, we will analyze the dynamics of human capital accumulation in all
countries and evaluate the role of migration of skilled workers. To account for the
potential incentive e¤ect of migration prospects on human capital formation, we
measure human capital as the proportion of high-skill natives, rather than high-skill
residents. We disregard the country where education was acquired. This assumption
is primarily guided by the data: international migrants are dened on the basis of
their country of birth, wherever they were trained. This contrasts with Rosenzweig
(2007) who emphasizes the e¤ect of migration prospects on student migration. The
outsourcing of education is followed by subsequent returns, which are potentially
benecial for poor countries.
Our model combines the time series dimension and the cross section variation
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of the data. Beyond the mere advantage of using much more observations, there
are a set of reasons that justify the use of a panel data approach rather than a
pure cross-section analysis. First, as well documented by Islam (1995) for income
levels, cross section results are subject to important mispecication biases. Failure to
control for the factors that inuence the human capital accumulation process leads
to omitted-variable biases as these factors are likely to be correlated with the initial
level of human capital. While the migration rates of skilled workers might be one of
these factors, a number of unobservable factors are likely to inuence human capital
accumulation.6 Assuming that these factors are constant over time, a panel data
analysis can take that into account through the introduction of country specic e¤ects
capturing part of the unobserved heterogeneity. The fact that the introduction of
xed e¤ects accounts only for the time-invariant unobservable factors is much less
limitative that it seems at rst glance. First, a lot of factors such as ethnic diversity
or degree of urbanization are relatively stable over time. Second, other factors such
as the cost of education or the quality of institutions exhibit a lot of inertia over time.
It is thus unclear whether their explicit inclusion (should we have observations for
these factors) in the regression model would improve signicantly the quality of t
and would reduce the degree of mispecication bias.
Second, extending the analysis to a panel dimension allows to account for the
e¤ect of shocks to human capital accumulation common to all countries. This is
indeed important for human capital levels since education levels have obviously im-
proved around the world along with increased globalization. Third, as for the role of
migration, a pure cross section analysis would implicitly assume a constant rate of
emigration of skilled workers for each country. This is obviously a strong assumption.
The regression model. Our regression model is based on a conventional con-
vergence equation with migration rates of skilled workers inuencing the long-run
6For instance, it is not possible to introduce education expenditures in the panel data analysis
due to the high number of missing information in most countries for a lot of years.
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levels of human capital among natives. We regress the average annual growth rate of
nativeshuman capital on the skilled migration rate and on the initial level of human
capital, rst allowing heterogenous responses for developing and rich countries:
1
5
ln

hi;t+5
hi;t

= 0 + i + t + rm
r
i;t + dm
d
i;t +  ln(hi;t) + i;t (8)
where hi;t denotes the level of human capital of natives for country i at time t (similar
notations hold for the migration rates), 0 is the intercept, i is the country-specic
e¤ect capturing the inuence on the long-run level of human capital of country-specic
factors that are constant over time, t captures the impact of common shocks across
countries specic to year t7, mri;t and m
d
i;t are the migration rate of skilled workers
coming from respectively rich and developing countries (following the World Bank
classication),  is a parameter measuring the speed of convergence to the long-run
level of human capital.
As a benchmark, this equation is estimated using time and individual e¤ects on
our samples.8 As discussed by Islam (2003), there is no optimal estimation method
for convergence equations in a panel data set-up. therefore, we consider alternative
techniques that account for specic methodological issues at stake here. It is im-
portant to understand that there are two separate econometric problems related to
equation (8). The rst one is related to the dynamic structure of equation (8) and is
well discussed in the recent econometric literature such as Islam (2003). The second
one is related to the possible endogeneity of mdi;t and m
r
i;t:
Let us rst look at the rst econometric problem. Equation (8) is dynamic in
the sense that ln(hi;t) enters as an explanatory variable. This leads to potential
econometric problems. The use of xed e¤ects and AR terms leads to inconsistency
of estimates, especially when the number of periods is increasing (Nickell, 1981).
7It should be emphasized that the estimates of t are all highly signicant at the 1% level. They
suggest that the growth rate of human capital was on average increasing over time.
8Hausman tests (not reported here to save space) strongly reject the inclusion of random e¤ects.
Furthermore, from a conceptual point of view, the use of random e¤ects does not make much sense
since we include almost all the countries of the world.
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Although the ratio of the cross-section dimension to the time dimension suggests
that the Nickell bias should be limited in our regressions, it is interesting to look at
alternative approaches. This is especially important here given the seemingly high
rate of convergence we get with the xed e¤ects specication. One way to overcome
this problem is to use instrumental variable estimation. To this aim, we estimate the
model using GMM regressions9 to assess the robustness of the results. Nevertheless,
as reminded by Islam (2003), GMM methods are also subject to signicant small
sample bias, as demonstrated by several Monte Carlo studies. Therefore, as stated
by Islam (2003), it is unclear whether GMM approaches dominate traditional xed
e¤ects estimates. This implies that the use of di¤erent estimators are desirable to
ensure the robustness of the estimates. To this aim, we estimate equation (8) using
standard techniques such as FGLS and GMM and compare the results across the
estimation methods.
As abundantly discussed in the theoretical framework, a second problem concerns
the endogeneity of migrations rates of skilled workers (mri;t and m
d
i;t) with respect
to the change in the human capital level. Basically, one can expect that migration
rates will be lower in countries in which the increase in the level of education has
been relatively stronger. Failure to account for some potential reverse causality is
likely to result in biased estimates of the parameters in general, and of r and d in
particular. To account for that, as an alternative to xed e¤ect estimates (FGLS),
we use instrumental variable estimation to estimate equation (8). More precisely, we
use lagged values of mri;t and m
d
i;t as instruments of the migration rates. First stage
regressions show that mri;t 1 and m
d
i;t 1 are strong predictors of current migration
rates with t-statistics above 9 and 10 respectively.10
9See Arrelano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), or Blundel and Bond (1992). We
use use the Arellano and Bover (1995) technique.
10Actually, it is important to notice that the use of IV estimation requires the choice of instruments
that both vary across countries and across time. This is due to the fact that the impact of time-
invariant variables cannot be jointly estimated with xed individual e¤ects. As a result, variables
such as colonial links or island cannot be considered as valid instruments.
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Finally, we also address the issue of the reliability of the sample. As discussed
above, our panel data set is based on migration data collected in 6 major receiving
countries. Our data capture a fraction of the skilled emigration to the OECD. Basi-
cally, the lower the proportion of migrants to OECD countries, the lower is the degree
of reliability of the migration data. In a rst step, we eliminate countries sending
less than 70% of their skilled migrants to the 6 main destinations, which leads to a
signicant loss of information. In a second step, we also use weighted FE estimation
in which the regression weights are given by the 2000 proportion of skilled migrants
captured in our sample. This allows to include more than 20 additional countries in
the regression sample.
Table 1 provides the estimation results of equation (8) using the four di¤erent
approaches explained above. Column (1) reports the estimates with the xed ef-
fect estimation. Column (2) gives the results using the GMM estimation procedure.
Columns (3) and (4) provide the instrumental variable estimation results, for the full
model and the parsimonious one. Column (5) gives the parameter estimates with the
weighted xed e¤ect estimation procedure. Finally, Column (6) gives estimates for
the random-e¤ects (RE) model.11
11Note that the use of RE estimates is provided here only for the sake of information only. As
explained by Islam (2003) RE estimates might be invalid since variables dening the country-specic
steady states such as the migration rates are correlated with the country specic e¤ect. This is also
likely to be case here.
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Table 1: Human capital and migration prospects: panel data results
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
 -.111*** -.074*** -.117*** -.118*** -.110*** -.013***
(0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.001)
r 0.071 0.079 0.172 - 0.070 0.018
(0.073) (0.068) (0.276) - (0.056) (0.019)
d 0.060** 0.108** 0.148** 0.147* 0.058** 0.015*
(0.027) (0.044) (0.068) (0.068) (0.027) (0.009)
Nb. obs. 735 735 588 588 855 735
Nb. countries 147 147 147 147 171 147
R2 0.6145 - 0.5552 0.5561 0.6064 0.0943
Note: Estimated equation (8). Fixed e¤ects i and t not reported. P-value: *p<0.1,
**p<0.05, ***p<0.01. In column (1), xed-e¤ects (FE) estimates are included. In column
(2), the GMM procedure is used to account for the endogeneity of the lagged dependent
variable. Columns (3) reports the instrumental variable estimation with emigration rates
instrumented by their lagged values. Column (4) gives the parsimonious version of column
(3). Column (5) gives the FE estimates with regression weighted by the proportion of
OECD migrants captured in the data set. Column (6) gives estimates for the random-
e¤ects (RE) model. Note that the Hausman test strongly rejects the RE specication. The
Hansen/Sargan J test (not reported here) supports the validity of the instruments in GMM
regressions. Note that since we have no overidentication degree in IV regressions, the
Hansen/Sargan J test is not conducted for IV estimates. Nevertheless, the Anderson test
supports the relevance of lagged migration rates as instruments in IV regressions.
Results of Table 1 suggest that our ndings are robust to the use of alternative
methods and approaches. These ndings can be summarized as follows. First, our
results suggest that a catching-up process in terms of education level has taken place
over the investigation period. The coe¢ cient relative to the initial value of human
capital is always highly signicant. Furthermore, the implied speed of convergence
(towards the country-specic steady state) is quite homogeneous across regressions.
It ranges from 8% to 12% per year. In other terms, it takes about 10 years for each
country to converge to its own long-run level of human capital.
Second, the results suggest that the emigration of skilled workers from developing
to rich countries tends to exert a positive impact on the long-run level of human
capital of these countries. The coe¢ cient of mdi;t is always signicantly positive in
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all regressions. This means that the obtained incentive e¤ect is robust to the use of
alternative regression methods. The IV method is nevertheless the only one coping
explicitly with the possible endogeneity of migration rates. Therefore, we will use
the IV method in subsequent regressions allowing for various schemes of country
classication.
Although Table 1 suggests that the results are qualitatively similar across regres-
sion techniques, the value of the estimated coe¢ cient of mdi;t does vary quite signi-
cantly. The size of the incentive e¤ect is found to be quite higher with IV estimates
compared to xed e¤ect or GMM estimates. This suggests that accounting for the
endogeneity of migration rates is important for the assessment of the incentive e¤ect
in poor countries. The di¤erences between the estimated coe¢ cients of mdi;t raises
the question of the predictability of the models. To address this issue, we proceed
for all estimated models to in-sample simulations of the human capital level. Using
estimates of Table 1 and on the basis of the initial value of the human capital level
(observed in 1975), we start from the observations for hi;1975 (human capital levels in
1975) and use (8) to forecast the values in 2000. Figure 2 plots the observed human
capital distribution in 2000 with the simulated one for the four alternative regression
techniques (FE, GMM, IV and RE). The rst three regression techniques that rely
on xed e¤ects lead to extremely similar forecasts which are relatively close to the
observations. This contrasts with the RE e¤ects model that leads to poor forecast of
the HK distribution. This is consistent with the results of the Hausman test which
tends to favour the use of xed rather than random e¤ects.
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Figure 2: In-sample simulation of the human capital distribution in 2000
-0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
HC_observed HC_FE HC_GMM HC_IV HC_RE
HC_observed = observed distribution of human capital in 2000; .HC_FE = simulated
distribution with xed e¤ects; HC_GMM = simulation with GMM; HC_IV = simulation
with IV method; ; HC_RE = simulation with random e¤ects.
Note that the decrease in the signicance level of d in columns (3)-(4) is due
to a blow-up of the standard error of the parameter rather than a decrease in the
value of the coe¢ cient. This is a well-known e¤ect due to the use of two-stage proce-
dures like the instrumental variable method used in this regression. Unsurprisingly,
the coe¢ cient of migration rate for rich countries (r) is never signicant at usual
condence levels. These results are consistent with the incentive hypothesis of skilled
migration for developing countries explained in a couple of theoretical and empirical
papers (Beine et al., 2001 and 2008, Stark et al., 1997, 1998, Stark and Wang, 2002).
Analysis by country group. Our theoretical model clearly shows that the
size of the incentive e¤ect depends on the level of development. Although the cross-
21
section results in Beine et al (2008) do not provide any evidence of a di¤erent impact
for the poorest countries, it is worth allowing for such di¤erentials in a panel setting.
In order to allow for di¤erent incentive impacts across types of countries, we make
explicit distinction between rich, intermediate and poor countries. In this respect,
we use some combination of the classications provided by the World Bank. In the
benchmark classication used in the general model (called classication 1), we include
in the rich group nations dened as high-income countries by the World Bank. The
remaining countries are included in the group of developing countries. The other
classications are generated by combining the 4 initial groups dened by the World
Bank into sub-groups, i.e. high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income
and low-income countries. Distinguishing groups instead of interacting the emigration
rate with the GDP per capita level avoids strong problems of endogeneity but also
implausible assumptions on the conditional e¤ect of migration. Table 2 provides the
denition of the classications.
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Table 2: Denition of country groups
Classication Our groups High-income Upper-mid Lower-mid Low-income
1 Rich *
Poor * * *
2 Rich *
Intermediate *
Poor * *
3 Rich *
Intermediate * *
Poor *
4 Rich * *
Intermediate *
Poor *
5 Rich *
Intermediate+ *
Intermediate- *
Poor *
Correspondence between our groups and the World Bank 2000 classication.
The results provided in Table 3 highly depend on the chosen classication of
sending countries. Therefore, it is desirable to check the robustness of the results
to alternative classication schemes. A further breakdown of the group of the less
developed countries might also be interesting. Such a breakdown could show which
type(s) of countries tend to drive the positive impact of migration of skilled workers
in terms of education. To this aim, we run the same regression procedure as the one
conducted in Table 1 but with alternative classications. We use IV estimation in
order to rule out any bias due to reverse causality. All rst-stage regression results
(not reported here to save space) show that the lagged values of skilled migration
rates are strong instruments of the current rates. Column (1) of Table 3 reports the
initial results with the benchmark classication. Columns (2) to (5) report the results
obtained with classications 2, 3, 4 and 5 as dened in Table 2.
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Table 3: Di¤erentiating the e¤ects by country group
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 -.117*** -.122*** -.118*** -.118*** -.118***
(0:008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
r 0.172 0.159 0.147 -.011 -.146
(0.321) (0.320) (0.328) (0.190) (0.329)
d 0.148** - - - -
(0.079)
i - -.066 -.054 -.049
(0.217) (0.129) (0.150)
i+ - - - - -.062
(0.223)
i  - - - - -.050
(0.150)
p - 0.187** 0.304*** 0.305*** 0.304***
(0:081) (0.098) (0.099) (0.099)
Nb. obs. 588 588 588 588 588
Nb. countries 147 147 147 147 147
R2 0.5552 0.5592 0.5388 0.5382 0.5390
Note: Estimated equation (8) in which developing countries are split according to Table
2. Fixed e¤ects i and t not reported. P-value: *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. All
regressions are estimated with instrumental variables. Lagged values of emigration rates
are used as instruments of current values
Results reported in Table 3 provide a strikingly similar picture as the one given
before. The results support the catching-up hypothesis and deliver similar speeds
of convergence. Concerning the inuence of migration rates on long-run levels of
human capital, the results allow to rene the previous interpretation. It is seen that
the positive incentive impact of migration rates of skilled workers is driven by the
e¤ects peculiar to the poorest countries. Results obtained with classications (3) to
(5) in which low-income countries (dened as in the World Bank classication) are
isolated, show that migration rates of poor countries exert strong, robust and positive
e¤ects in terms of human capital accumulation. In column (2), this result still holds
when lower-middle-income countries are associated to low-income countries, but the
coe¢ cient is much lower and less signicant. Once again, this is consistent with the
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idea that the incentive e¤ect concerns mainly the poorest countries.
We conclude that a strong incentive e¤ect is at work in low-income countries. By
increasing the expected return to education, migration prospects foster the number of
natives investing in human capital. In poor countries, such an incentive e¤ect makes
the global impact of the brain drain on human capital ambiguous. In the middle-
income and rich countries, we nd no evidence of a positive incentive e¤ect. The brain
drain then unambiguously reduces the stock of human capital in these countries.
5 The case for a brain gain
In this section, we turn our attention to low-income countries and investigate whether
the incentive mechanism is strong enough to generate a brain gain (i.e. a positive
net/global e¤ect on human capital accumulation). We use the estimated model to
simulate the net impact of the brain drain on the level human capital in low-income
countries. It is worth reminding that our in-sample simulations of the human capital
level indicated that our empirical model with xed e¤ects generates predictions which
are extremely close to observations. On Figure 2, the proportion of educated of each
country can be accurately predicted once two country characteristics are known: the
observed high-skill emigration rate (mi) and the country xed e¤ect (i) estimated
in (8). This suggests that our numerical exercises can be reasonably trusted.
Our numerical experiment is simple. For each possible value of the country xed
e¤ect (in low-income countries, i ranges from -0.6 to -0.3), our simulation consists
in letting the skilled emigration rate (mi) vary between 0 and 100 percent and using
the empirical model to compute the ex-post proportion of educated remaining in the
country. As the empirical model is dynamic, human capital adjustments take several
periods. Hence, to capture the full scale of the brain drain impact on human capital,
our numerical experiments are conducted at the steady state.
Clearly, our empirical and theoretical models suggest that the human capital re-
sponse to changes in skilled emigration is ambiguous. We have shown that ex-ante,
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skilled migration prospects foster human capital formation of natives originating from
low-income countries. Ex-post, skilled migration reduces the number of remaining ed-
ucated adults. Our simulations combine these two e¤ects. Simulations are based on
the two following equations (9) and (10). Equation (9) is the long-run expression of
(8), which characterizes the size of the ex-ante incentive mechanism. If  is negative
(a result always obtained in our regressions), the ex-ante level of human capital (i.e.
proportion of educated among natives) converges toward a country-specic equilib-
rium. Imposing ln(hi;t+5) = ln(hi;t) in (8), we can easily derive the expression of the
steady state proportion of educated among natives:
hi;ss = exp

0 + i + ss + mi
 

(9)
where ss is the long-run value of the time xed e¤ect.
Then, following (4), the ex-post e¤ect is governed by:
Hi;ss =
(1 mi)hi;ss
1 mihi;ss : (10)
Figure 3 gives a three-dimension representation of the simulation results. Country
characteristics are represented on the horizontal axes. The skilled emigration rate mi
varies between 0 and 100 percent; the country xed e¤ect i varies from -0.6 to -0.3.
The long-run proportion of remaining high-skill workers Hi;ss is represented on the
vertical axis. The numerical experiment is based on the parameter set (; 0; i; )
estimated in Column 3 of Table 3; we assume that ss is the time xed e¤ect estimated
for the year 2000. Under the latter assumption, it is worth noticing that this simple
simulation model (9)-(10) generates a steady state distribution of human capital
which is extremely close to the distribution observed in 2000 (results are unreported
but available upon request).
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Figure 3: Brain drain and human capital accumulation in low-income
countries
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FE stands for xed e¤ect; in poor countries, xed e¤ects range from -0.6 to -0.3.
Simulation are based on classication 3 in Table 2, and column (3) in Table 3.
It clearly appears that the xed e¤ect has a strong impact on the long-run level
of human capital, especially at low skilled emigration rates. This result is not sur-
prising as xed e¤ects captures many determinants of human capital formation such
as education policies, returns to skills, governance, ethnic discrimination, etc. More
importantly, the link between human capital and high-skill emigration rate is char-
acterized by an inverted U-shaped relationship. The latter result conrms the the-
oretical model and predictions from cross-country analyzes (see Beine et al, 2008,
2009). We observe that, a low levels of emigration, the brain drain has a small but
positive net impact on human capital accumulation. The optimalmigration rate
(i.e. maximizing residentshuman capital) varies between 20 and 30 percent: it is
around 20 percent in countries where the xed e¤ect is low and around 30 percent in
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countries where the xed e¤ect is higher. However, when the emigration rate exceeds
its "optimal" value, the human capital loss increases exponentially compared to the
closed economy benchmark. Obviously, when the high-skill emigration rate is 100
percent, the proportion of educated among educated adults is equal to 0.
Data reveals that brain drain rates are lower than 20-30 percent in the vast ma-
jority of low-income countries, except in a couple of very small states. Consequently,
our results suggest that most low-income countries experience a net brain gain of
small size. On the contrary, in the absence of signicant incentive e¤ect ex-ante,
middle-income and high-income countries are likely to su¤er from the brain drain.
6 Conclusion
The new growth literature has stressed the role of human capital for economic de-
velopment. Hence, the emigration of skilled workers is usually blamed for depriving
developing countries of their most talented workers. This view has been challenged
by a new literature putting forward multiple positive feedback e¤ects for sending
countries. However, the empirical literature on the consequences of the brain drain
remains quite limited. In particular, several contributions demonstrate that skilled
migration prospects can increase human capital accumulation ex-ante, possibly turn-
ing the brain drain into a brain gain. Due to data limitations, existing empirical
studies are based on cross-sectional regressions and su¤er from the bias of omitted
variables/unobserved heterogeneity, and the di¢ culty to solve potential endogeneity
problems.
Taking advantage of a new panel data set of emigration rates by education level,
this paper conrms the existence of a strong incentive mechanism when unobserved
heterogeneity and endogeneity issues are seriously addressed. In addition, it comes
out that such an incentive e¤ect is only perceptible among low-income countries
for which migration premia are high. In middle-income and rich countries, migration
prospects have no signicant impact on education decisions so that skilled emigration
28
rates directly reect their loss of human capital. In poor countries, the net e¤ect of
the brain drain on human capital is positive when the brain drain is not too high (say
lower than 20 to 30 percent depending on country characteristics). This is the case
of many countries, except very small states. When the emigration rate exceeds that
threshold, the human capital loss induced by the brain drain increases exponentially.
Many questions and sources of uncertainty remain in the literature on the con-
sequences of the brain drain. Where did migrants acquire education? Can the out-
sourcing of education explain the positive correlation between emigration rates and
human capital investments? Does the outsourcing of education lead to important
return ows of educated migrants? Is the incentive e¤ect depending on the destina-
tion? Does the brain drain induce severe occupational shortage? In our regressions,
many of these factors (outsourcing of education, return migration, etc.) are likely to
be assimilated to pure incentive mechanisms. It would be helpful to build new micro
surveys explicitly conducted to capture the relationship between emigrants and their
country of origin, to collect more data and case-studies on the sectoral impact of the
brain drain, to improve the quality of human capital indicators of residents. However,
within the limits of a macroeconomic approach, our analysis provides an additional
argument in favor of the incentive mechanism. A global research agenda based on
multi-level studies (combining country cases, micro and macro studies) would be
needed to rene the nature of the e¤ect captured in our regressions.
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